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VERTICAL FORECLOSURE  AND INTERNATIONAL  TRADE POLICY 
ABSTRACT 
We examine conditions  under which a low cost vertically integrated 
manufacturer has an incentive  to export an intermediate  product to its higher 
cost (vertically  integrated)  rival rather  than to vertically foreclose, fully 
cutting off supplies.  The nature  of supply conditions  in the importing 
country, the size of an import tariff  on the final good and optimal policy  by 
the exporting country are all shown to be important  for this  decision.  The 
exporting  country may gain by taxing  exports of the final (Cournot)  product 
even though,  under Cournot competition, an export subsidy is optimal in the 
absence of a market for intermediates.  In this case,  optimal policy alao 
requires an export tax on intermediates,  but the higher tax on final goods 
serves  to divert sales  to the more profitable  market for intermediates 
increasing  the extent  of vertical supply.  It is optimal to tax the  export  of 
both goods or to subsidize the export  of both goods. It is never optimal to 
tax one and subsidize the other. 
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In countries that are dependent on imports of a  key intermediate product 
or  raw material from a dominant world supplier there is often substantial 
concern about the price and the availability of  imports. For example, Japanese 
suppliers (with the help of  the Japanese government) recently restricted the 
exports of one megabite DRAM computer chips, substantially raising their price'. 
These suppliers control about BOX of  the market for computer chips and the 
higher prices and shortage in  supply  have forced  U.S. producers of  computers to 
curtail production and increase prices. Vertically integrated Japanese firms such 
as Toshiba and N.E.C. have benefitted both from increased profits in the market 
for computer chips and from the improvement in  their competitive position in the 
market for final computers. 
This paper first examines the incentives for a vertically integrated firm to 
export an intermediate product to a  higher cost foreign rival,  lowering its rival's 
costs, rather than  to engage in vertical foreclosure thus fully cutting off 
supplies2. The rival is also assumed to be vertically integrated, but it can 
produce the intermediate product only at a  higher  (and increasing) marginal cost. 
Differences in coats, which give rime to the possibility of vertical supply (the 
supply of an  intermediate product to a rival)  ,  occur most  naturally in an 
international context because of differences in  endowments and technologies 
across countries. A firm in one country may have  control over a cheaper source 
of  supply of  raw material or,  as in the above example, it  may have a superior 
technology in the production of an  important manufacturing component, such as 
a computer chip. 
We consider the moat  extreme form of  dependence on  a vertically integrated supplier by  assuming that a aingle vertically integraced firm controls the exports 
of  both  the intermediate and final products. If  the rival firm in  the importing 
country has no  independent source of  supply, vertical foreclosure would sllow the 
exporting firm to enjoy a monopoly in the market for the final good. In  this 
situation, the exporting firm will choose vertical foreclosure. However, even s 
small tariff imposed on  the import of  the final good  will induce the export of 
some of the intermediate product. If  the rival firm has access to the 
intermediate good either through its own production or  through imports, then 
sales of the final good  in the importing country are determined by  Cournot 
competition. The implications of Bertrand  behaviour in  the export market for the 
final product are considered in Appendix A. 
The exporting firm  is assumed able to act first by committing to an export 
strategy (price or quantity) for the intermediate product prior to the decision of 
the high cost firm as to its own level of production of  the intermediate good 
and to the resolution of the Cournot output game for the final good. This aeans 
that the exporting firm is aware of  its  rival's optimal reaction to an  increase in 
the export price (or a decrease in the export quantity) of  the intermediate 
product based on  its rival's alternative costs of  production. The low cost firm is 
essentially in the position of a 'dominant  supplier with a competitive fringe' in 
the export market for the intermediate  product, but not for the final product. 
The assumption that a foreign supplier has 'dominance' is intended as a 
first approach in  examining the consequence for the importing country of a 
substantial dependence on  foreign supplies. It  has the advantage that the vertical 
supply (or foreclosure) decision is made with  a full understanding of  its 
consequences. Also, this setting allows us to highlight the importance of 
differing cost conditions for the production of  the intermediate product in the importing country. Both  the absolute quantities and the responsiveness of these 
supplies are shown to be  important factors in the vertical supply decision. 
In assessing the likely consequences of  dependence on  foreign supplies, 
it is important to examine public as well as private incentives in the exporting 
country. If the low coat firm chooses  to supply the foreign rival, will 
'government foreclosure' (government policy to  prevent exports of the 
intermediate product) be in  the interest of  the exporting country? We  show that 
if the exporting firm initially enjoys a higher profit margin from the export of 
the intermediate than the final product  (as  a consequence of an import tariff on 
the final good), government policy amplifies this difference which tends to 
increase the extent of  vertical supply. Perhaps surprisingly, this policy is 
achieved by a tax,  not a subsidy, on  the exports of the intermediate product, 
together  with  a (larger) tax on  the exports of the final product. Indeed, it is 
never optimal to subsidize the exports of  one good  and tax the exports of  the 
other. 
The possibility that an  export tax on the final good may increase national 
welfare may be somewhat unexpected given the Spencer and Brander  (1983)  result 
that an  export subsidy increases national welfare in a  Cournot duopoly with one 
domestic and one foreign firm. We  set out some simple conditions under which 
the presence of  the export market for the intermediate product switches optimal 
policy from an  export subsidy on  the final good  to an  export tax.  Conversely. if 
there is Bertrand competition for the final differentiated products, we show that 
the existence of  vertical supply may make it optimal to subsidize the export of 
the final good. 
Vertical foreclosure has been  an  important issue in  the antitrust literature 
and in  industrial organization. Two very interesting recent papers, Salinger (1988) and Ordover. Saloner and Salop (1988),  show that vertical merger for the purpose 
of vertical foreclosure can be an  effective atrategy when there ia imperfect 
competition in  the market  for both the  intermediate and final products. In both 
these papers, producers of  the intermediate product have  identical and constant 
costs and vertical merger  results in  a full cutting off of supplies to downsteam 
firms3.  In  contrast, the present model demonstrates that  asymmetries in costs 
can make vertical supply profitable for a dominant firm. If the supply of the 
intermediate good in the importing country is sufficiently elastic, then vertical 
supply4  by  the low cost firm is an equilibrium strategy even in  the absence of 
commercial policy intervention by  either country. 
This paper is also related to the international trade literature concerning 
the optimal choice of commercial policy to exploit the relationship between 
exports of a final good and exports of  an  input used  in its production, (see for 
example Kemp (1966), Jones  (1967)  and Jones and Spencer  (1989)).  However, this 
literature applies only to perfect competition and there is no consideration of 
the issue of  vertical foreclosure. Finally, this paper draws on  the literature 
concerning trade policy under imperfect competition. Of  special relevence are 
Dixit (1984),  Eaton and Grossman (1986),  Grossman and Dixit  (1986),  Venables 
(1985)  and Brander and Spencer (1985). 
Section 2  of  the pet;r contains the basic model and the second stage 
Cournot output equilibrium is described in Section 3.  Section 4 is concerned with 
the conditions for vertical supply of the intermediate good.  The optimal trade 
policies for the exporting country are derived in  Section 5 and Section 6 
contains some concluding remarks. 
2.  The Model 
A vertically integrated firm,  firm I,  in country 1 (potentially) exports the quantity x of an  intermediate good and the quantity y1 of  a final good to 
country 2.  Firm  2 in country 2 purchasea x from firm  1  at a price r and also 
uses some of its own supplies x2 of the (homogeneous) intermediate good to 
produce y2 of the final good for domestic sale.  The price p of  the final good in 
country 2 is given by  the inverse demand curve p — p(Y)  where p'(Y) C  0 and Y 
— y1  + y2 represents aggregate output. We abstract from the possibility that the 
final good is also sold in  country  1.  If  the rwo  markets are segmented, this 
involves no loss of generality. 
Technological relationships are simplified by  assuming that one unit of the 
intermediate good is required to produce one unit of  the final good and that 
there are no  other factors of production5. Firm 1 produces the intermediate good 
(and the final good)  -at a constant marginal cost c1,  whereas firm 2 can produce 
irs own supplies of the intermediate good only at at  a higher  (and increasing) 
marginal cost. This means that c2 > c1 where c2 denotes firm 2's marginal cost 
of production of x2 at  x2 — 0.  We assume that firm 2  is vertically integrated, 
but this is not necessary. The intermediate good could be  supplied by an 
increasing cost competitive industry in country 2. 
Export polity by country I is expressed by a specific subsidy s  to exports 
of rhe final good and a specific tax v to exports of the intermediate product. 
The subsidy s  and the tax v may be  either positive or negative. Country 2 
imposes a specific tariff t on  imports of  the final good. We  can now write  the 
total profit of  firm 1 ftom the export of  y1 and x as, 
It'  — (p 
-  (t-s+t,))y, + (r 
-  v  -  c,)x.  (21) 
Firm 2's profit from the sale of  y' is given by 
it2  —  p(Y)y, 
-  rx -  C2(x2)  (2.2) 
where y2 — x + x2,  and C2(x2)  represents the total cost of production of x,. 6 
Marginal cost C(x2) is assumed to be  strictly increasing: C(x2) > 0. 
The structure of decisions is identified by  stages. In stage 0,  country 
1. 
commits to its export policies a and v and country 2 commits to its import tsriff 
t.  In  stage 1,  firm 1 commits to the price r that it  will  charge for the export of 
the intermediate good. Subsequently, the quantities y1 and y2 of  the final good 
are determined by  a Cournot (quantity Nash) equilibrium in stage 2.  Firm 2 is 
free to import its desired quantity of  the intermediate good at this stage, and to 
produce its own supplies. 
The equilibrium of  the game played by firms is subgame perfect6.  In  setting 
the export price for the intermediate  product in  stage 1,  firm I  takes into 
account both  the subsequent (Cournot)  Nash equilibrium  in the market for the 
final good and the response of firm 2 in the production of  its own supplies. This 
means  that firm  1  takes full account of  the effect of  the export price r on the 
profits that it can earn from the sale of the final good.  In particular, firm 1 can 
choose not to  export the intermediate  product (vertical foreclosure)  by setting r 
at a prohibitive level. 
Support for the credibility of this  structure can be found by  considering an 
alternative form of our model in  which firm 1 commits to the level of  exports 
(rather that to the price) of  the intermediate good  in stage 1. With  quantity 
commitment in the firsr  uage, the price received for exports is determined by  a 
market clearing condition in stage 2 ensuring that demand equals total supply 
(including the quantity of  the intermediate good that is produced in country 2) 
Exporting of  the intermediate good takes time and these exports must  be 
available at  the time of production of  the final good. However, production of  the 
intermediate product for local use can take place contemporaneously with 
production of  the final good. The level of  exports of  the intermediate good might then naturally be  determined prior to the production of the intermediate good in 
country 2. 
3.  The  Final Coods  Market 
Thia  section is concerned with the equilibrium in the second stage of the 
model. Substituting for x —  y2 
-  x2 in  (2.2),  firm 2's profit can be written as, 
— (p 
-  r)y2 + rx2  C2(x2)  (3,1) 
We firat consider firm 2's choice between ita own production of the 
intermediate good and use of imported supplies. Firm 2 chooses x2 ? 0  to 
maximize  (3.1)  for  given  levels  of  y1,  y2  and r.  Since C(x2) > 0, the profit 
function is stricly concave in x2 and the optimal choice of x2 satisfies the first 
order condition: 
r -  C(x2)  C 0  (— 0  if x2  > 0)  (3.2) 
If x2  > 0,  (3.2)  implicitly defines the supply of x2 as an  increasing function of  r: 
x2 — x2(r)  where x  — 1/C(x2)  > 0.  If the marginal cost of  production of  x2 
everywhere exceeds the import price r, C(O) — c2  > r,  then firm 2  sets x2 = 0 
and  produces  using  imported  supplies  only.  This includes the special case in 
which production of x2 is prohibitively expensive so that production by firm 2 
requires the use of  imported supplies. 
At  the stage 2 Cournot equilibrium for the final good, Firm 1 chooses its 
output y1 to maximize (2.1),  given y2, x  —  y2-x2  and the prior committed values 
of r,  t,  s, and v.  Similarly, firm 2 chooses y2 to maximize (3.1),  given y1,  x2, r, 
t, s and v. If x2 — 0,  then y2 — x.  The first order conditions are: 
n(y1,y2,r,t-s,v) — p  +  yip' 
-  (t-s+c1)  — 0  (3.3) 
— p  + y2p' 
- r — 0  (3.4) 
Solving (3.3) and (3.4)  simultaneously, we obtain the Cournot equilibrium levels of 
output as  functions of  r,  and t -  s: Yi — y(r,t-s) and y2 — y2(r,t-s)  (3.5) 
The value of  v affects y1 and Y2 only through its influence on r,  the export 
price of  the intermediate good. 
Own marginal profit is assumed to decline with an increase in the output of 
the other firm.  That is, 
— p'  + y1p''  CO  and ir1 — p'  +  y2p''  <0  (3.6) 
his is equivalent to the assumption that reaction functions are downward sloping. 
These conditions guarantee that the second order conditions for profit 
maximization hold. 
— 2p'  +  y1p''  C 0 and ff22  — 2p'  + y2p''  <  0  (3.7) 
Moreover, conditions (3.6)  imply 
H  — irhir2 
-  whirl — p'(3p'  +  Yp'') >0  (3.8) 
which ensures that the Cournot equilibrium is unique. 
The comparative static effects of an  increase in r  on  y1 and y2 can be 
obtained from total differentiation of  the first order conditions (3.3)  and (3.4). 
These effects are signed using (3.6),  (3.7) and (3.8). 
y(r,t-s)  — -p42/H  > 0 and y(r,t-s)  —  i41/H  <  0  (3.9) 
Similarly, the response of y1 and y2 to changes in  s and t are given by 
y  -y(r,t-s) — -42/H > 0 and y  — -y(r,t-s) — ir1/H < 0.  (3.10) 
Also, from (3.9)  and U.  O),  industry output is decreasing in  r, increasing ins 
and decreasing in t: 
Yr(r,t-s) — p'/H C 0 and 15 — -Y(r,t-s) — -p'/H > 0  (3.11) 
Finally, a unit increase in  r increases the price of  the final good  but by  less 
than one unit.  From (3.6),  (3.8)  and (3.11), 
d(r-p)/dr — l-p'Y5 — p'(2p'+Yp'')/H  >  0  (3.12) 
In otherwords, an increase in  r increases r-c1 
-  (p-t-c1)— r-p+t, the difference 9 
between the profit margins that firm 1  earns from the export of  the intermediate 
and final products. This difference in profit margins features prominently in the 
subsequent results. 
4.  The Intermediate Cooda Market; Vertical Foreclosure or Vertical Supply 
The demand by  firm 2 for imports of the intermediate good from firm 1 is 
firm 2's output of  the final good at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium less its own 
production  (if any) of  the intermediate good. 
x(r,t-s) — y2(r,t-s) 
- x2(r)  (4.1) 
The exporting firm, firm 1,  is aware of this actual demand for imports when  it 
chooses r in  stage 1. An  increase in  r tends to reduce the demand for imports of 
the intermediate good, both  because it decresses firm 2's final output and 
because it  induces firm 2 to produce more of  the intermediate good. Also, from 
(3.10), the demand for x is decreasing in s and increasing in t: 
xr(r,t-s) — y 
-  x <0  and x3 — -x5(r,t-a)  — y <0.  (4.2) 
Vertical foreclosure occurs if firm 1 sets a prohibitive price r  for the 
intermediate good.  Setting x(rP,r.a) — 0  implicitly  defines  r  — r(t-a) where, 
r  — -rt(t-a)  — -y/x C 0  (4.3) 
The  prohibitive  export  price  for  the  intermediate  good  is  decreasing  in  a  and 
increasing  in  t. An  increase in  a decreases firm 2'a marginal profits from its 
output y2 and therefore decreases firm 2's demand for imports x. 
At r — r, firm 2  produces y2 using only its own production of the 
intermediate good and,  from (3.4), y2 — x2  satisfies, 
p + x2p'  — r  (4.4) 
If the production of x2 is prohibitively expensive at r — r,  then (from (3.2)  x2 
— 0  and  (4.4)  implies that r  — p.  Vertical foreclosure then gives firm 1 monopoly 
power in the market for the final good'. 10 
Firm l's profit at  stage 1 can be  written directly as a  function of  the 
export price r and trade taxes and subsidies, t, a,  and v set in stage 0.  Let  ,tE 
represent this function (where E stands for the exporting firm)  ,  then 
— E(.t5V) — (p-t+s-c1)y'(r,t-s)  + (r-v-c1)x(r,t-s)  (45) 
From differentiation of (4.5)  using  (3.3),  the effect of an  increase in r on  ir is, 
— (r-v-ct)xr + x  + y1p'y  (4.6) 
The first two terms of (4.6)  represent the direct effect of  an  increase in r on 
the profits of firm 1 from the export of the intermediate good. The third 
(positive) term captures the 'strategic effect' of r on  the profits earned from the 
export of the final good. Since y  > 0 and Y  C  0,  an  increase in r increases 
both the volume and the price of  exports of  the final good. 
In  stage 1,  firm 1 chooses r to maximize  itt  subject to r S r.  To obtain 
the conditions for a maximum, define the Lagrangean L —  ÷  p(r(t-a) 
- r) 
where p represents the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions for a 
maximum are then, 
—  - p —0  and  L5  — r(t-s) 
-  r ? 0,  p?  0, L5.p —0  (4.7) 
We assume  that mE is strictly concave8 for all r  r,  ensuring that 1rE achieves 
a global maximum whenever the first order conditions are satisfied. 
If r(r,t-s,v) 
.c  0, a reduction in r below r  increases it5  and,  from (4.7), 
vertical supply occurs (c  r")  and the Lagrange multiplier p  — 0.  At a vertical 
supply equilibrium, ir(r,t-s,v) — 0  implicitly  defines  r  — r(t-s,v) with partial 
derivatives, 
r,(t-s,v)  — -r(t-s,v) — itt/Wr and r(t-s,v)  —  >  0.  (4.8) 
The sign of r  follows from w  — -x C 0. An  increase in the export tax v 
increases the price r paid by  firm 2 for imports of  the intermediate product9. 
If ir(r,t-s,v) — 0,  then r(t-s,v) — r(t-s)  with p — 0  and  vertical 11 
foreclosure  occurs.  Finally, it  it(rP,t-s,v)  >  0, then  p > 0, and r is  constrained 
at  the foreclosure  level rP(t-s). 
To  examine  the conditions underlying the vertical  supply  or foreclosure 
decision, it is useful to rearrange (4.6),  using (4.2)  and (3.3), to obtain 
— (r-p+t  (s+v))y +  x -  (r-v-c1)x  (4.9) 
Let c — rx/x2  0 represent the elasticity of supply of  x2 in  country  2.  Also 
define  flr 
—  ry2/Y  > 0  to be  the (positive) elasticity  (with respect to an 
increase in r) of  the derived demand for the intermediate  product. Then,  from 
(4.7) and (4.9), firm  1  chooses vertical supply if and only if 
s(rP,t-s,v)  — -(y5/rP)((r'p+t 
•  (s+v))t1 + (rP-v-c1)rJ  < 0  (4.10) 
Fiure 1 
Prior  to the imposition of  trade policy by the exporting  country (s—v—0), 
from  (4.10), the boundary at  which vertical foreclosure just  occurs  is given by 
t —  p 
- r  - (rP_c)c/q  (4.11) 
This boundary  condition  is illustrated by the curve FF in  Figure  1. Along  the 
v. 
0  Er 12 
horizontal  axia  of Figure  1,  the aupply curve  for x2 ia asaumed to ahift so as to 
increaae c  at r, but to maintain  x2 — x2(r)  fixed. That is,  the supply turve 
for x2 is assumed to rotate clockwise  at r — r  ensuring  that,  as 5r is  increased, 
r  and the values of  x2,  p, and ,  evaluated  at r  do not change. FF is 
negatively  sloped if demand  is not too non linear'0. The region  of  vertical 
foreclosure  is shown  by the shaded  area to the left of  FF. The area strictly to 
the right of FF represents  the region  of  vertical  supply. 
Whether vertical  foreclosure  occurs is heavily  influenced  by production 
conditions  for the intermediate  good  in  the importing  country as well as by the 
tariff. We consider  two important  aspects of local production  conditions:  the 
total quantity x'(r) of supplies available  at  the foreclosure point and the 
responsiveness  of  these  supplies as measured  by Cr 
From  (4.4),  p-rn — -  x2(r)p' and the quantity  x2(r) affects the size of the 
price  spread  p-rn.  From (4.11), this price spread in turn  determines  the point  at 
which the boundary  FF  intersects  the vertical axis of Figure  1.  If t> p-rn,  then 
firm  1 earns a strictly higher  profit  margin  from  the export of  the interaediate 
than  the final good  at r — r  and firm 1 chooses vertical  supply. 
If  country  2  has no independent  source of supply  of  the intermediate 
product,  then  x2  0,  the price  difference  p - r  — 0 and FF  reduces  to a point 
at  the origin  of  Figun::  1.  If the tariff  t — 0,  then the equilibrium  is at the 
origin  and firm  1 chooses vertical  foreclosure. However,  any  positive  tariff will 
induce vertical  supply. A small  tariff on  exports of the final  good  decreases  the 
profit  margin  on  sales  of  the final good  and gives  firm  1 en  incentive  to  get 
'under' the tariff  wall  by supplying the good  produced  at a lower stage  of 
production. 
If  country 2 can produce  a positive but fixed quantity  of  x2 at the 13 
foreclosure  point  (that is if the supply curve x'(r) is vertical"  at  r5)  firm 1 
may choose  vertical  foreclosure  even if t is positive.  An  exogenous  increase  in 
the fixed quantity of  supplies  shifts up the point  at  which  FF intersects  the 
vertical axis in Figure  1 increasing  the range of t at  which  there is  vertical 
foreclosure  (with c  — 0).  This occurs because a  higher  level of  x2 lowers  the 
value of  r5 at  which firm 2 chooses not to import x reducing  the profit  margin 
that firm 1 can earn  from  the export of  the intermediate product.  Vertical 
foreclosure  is thus more  likely  if an  importing country has a larger  (but fixed) 
quantity  of its own  supplies  of  the intermediate product. 
These results are reported in  Proposition  I together with  the sign of the 
profit margin  condition r(t,O)-p+t  at  the vertical  supply  equilibrium  should  it 
occur. As  ahown  in  the next aection, the sign of this profit margin  condition  is 
important for optimal export policy by  country  1. 
Promosition  1 (assume s!=v_0) 
Suppose that the importing country can produce only a fixed quantity x2 ? 
o of the intermediate good 
—  0),  then 
(i)  The condition  r-p+t > 0 is necessary and sufficient  for vertical 
aupply. At a vertical supply  equilibrium, firm 1 earns a  higher  profit margin  from 
the export  of the intermediate  good than  the final good: r(t,0)-p+t > 0. 
(ii)  In  the absence of  a tariff, firm 1 will vertically  foreclose. 
(iii)  If  x2  — 0,  a small tariff will  induce vertical  supply. 
(iv)  An exogenous  increase in  x2 increases the range of tariff  values  at 
which vertical  forecloaure  occurs. 
flQ.f:  (i) With c  — 0,  and a—v—0,  (4.10)  holda  if  and only  if r-p+t > 0.  At 
a vertical supply  equilibrium  r(r(t,0),t,O)  — 0  and  (4.9)  with x  — 0  and s—v—O 
implies r(t,0)-p+t  > 0.  (ii)  From (4.4), r-p+t — x,p'+t  0 at t — 0  for  any  x2  ? 0 14 
and vertical foreclosure occurs from Proposition  1(i).  (iii)  If  x2 a 0 and  t >  0, 
r-p+t — t > 0 and vertical supply occurs from Proposition 1(i).  (iv)  If  Cr — ° at 
r,  the boundary condition (4.11)  becomes t  — p(Y(r,t))-r where r  — r(t,x2)  as 
defined by  y2(r,t)-x2 — 0.  An  increase in x2 increases the boundary value of  t 
since dt/dx2 — -(l-ptYr)drP/dxa/(lpYt+(l-ptYr)rt)  > 0. The sign follows since  1- 
P"r — l-p'Y > 0 from (3.11)  and (3.12),  r  > 0 and dr/dx2  — l/y C 0.  *** 
Now consider the case where Cr > 0 snd supplies of  the intermediate good 
sre responsive to price. As illustrated  in Figure 1, an increase in the 
responsiveness of  supplies in  country 2 or a  higher tariff tends to move the 
equilibrium towards vertical supply. 
Proposition 2 (assume s—v—0 snd Cr >  0) 
(i) For any given t, an  increase in Cr, holding x2(r) fixed,  moves the 
equilibrium towards vertical supply.  Vertical supply occurs if 
C  > 
(ii)  A sufficiently large value of  t  will induce the export of  the 
intermediate product. 
Proof: (i) From (4.10),  with t and x2(r) fixed, d1r(rP(t),t,O)/dCr  — 
c1)/r <  0. At  the  boundary FF,  ,r(r,t,0) — 0.  and  an  increase in  Cr will make 
ir(r,t,O) C 0  inducing  vertical  supply.  The  stated  condition  for  follows  from 
(4.10).  (ii)  Since l-p'Y.  — 1-p'Y > 0 from (3.11)  and (3.12), d(r(t)-p+t))/dt  — 
4(lp'Yr) + l-p'Y  > 0. Hence, a sufficiently  large value of  t  will make r(t)- 
p+t  0, which, from (4.10),  is a sufficient condition for vertical supply.*** 
Proposition 2(i) indicates that if  Cr is sufficiently large, the equilibrium  wil 
be  one of vertical supply even in the absence of  a tariff. Why does a larger 
value of C tend to move the equilibrium towards  vertical supply?  Generally, a 
reduction in  r  below r  increases firms 2's level of  output boosting its  demand 1.5 
for x, but, at the same time, reducing the  production of  x2. As c, becomes 
larger, the extent of  the substitution between the two sources of  supply of  the 
intermediate good increases.  For a given reduction in  r, firm I achieves a 
greater increase in its sales of x for the same increase in  firm 2's output of  the 
final good. 
It  is useful to consider the special case in  which  Cr —  (infinitely  elastic 
supply). In  this case, the marginal cost of  production of  x2 is constant st c2 and 
firm 2 sets x2 — 0,  using imports x only,  if r <  c2  and produces y2 using its own 
supplies otherwise. The prohibitive export price r  of  the intermediate good 
equals c2. Firm 1 can always gain (relative  to vertical foreclosure) by  supplying 
the intermediate  product at a  price r just below c2,  since it then earns positive 
profits from the export of x and this supply  has no  effect on  firm 2's marginal 
cost of  production of  the final good'2.  This implies thst there is always vertical 
supply in equilibrium even without a tariff. 
This result is related to a Katz and Shapiro (1985)  proposition concerning 
the licensing of a  superior technology by  a Cournot duopolist under constant 
returns to scale. They show that an innovating firm will always licence a 
superior technology to its  rival provided the license contract can include a per 
unit royalty charge as well as a fixed fee.  The per unit royalty charge can be 
set so as  to leave the rival's marginal cost unaffected (as in our model) and the 
fixed fee can be  used  to distribute the net gain from  the reduction in  the cost 
of the  rival's production.  Katz and Shepiro (1985)  do  not analyse the implications 
of increasing costs of  production in the rival firm or the effects of  trade policy. 
Also, in  this special case with tr —  ,  the equilibrium outcome is the same 
as would occur if there were a Bertrand equilibrium in  the market for the 
homogeneous intermediate  product in  Stage 1 and a Cournot equilibrium (as 16 
before) in Stage 2. The Bertrand aupplier in country 2 aeta ita price equal to its 
marginal cost c2, but it supplies zero in  equilibrium since it is in  the interests 
of  firm 1 to undercut. However, there is Edgeworth instability and no pure 
strategy equilibrium under Bertrand competition if  Cr < . 
Returning to our main case where 0  < r5 <  and s—v—0, Proposition 3  aeta 
out the conditions under which the equilibrium is one of vertical supply or, 
alternatively, vertical foreclosure.  Note that in  Proposition 3(u), the firm engages 
in  vertical supply despite the fact that the profit margin from the export of the 
intermediate  product at the foreclosure  point falls short of  the  profit  margin 
from the export of  the final product. Proposition 3 also characterizes the 
conditions under which firm 1 earns a higher (or lower) profit  margin from the 
export of the intermediate product than the final product at  a  vertical supply 
equilibrium. Generally, this difference in  profit margins is negative only et  high 
values of  c5. 
Proposition 3 (assume s—v—0 and  > 0) 
(i) if rP(t)-p+t  0, then  firm I chooses  vertical supply and at  the vertical 
supply equilibrium (a)  r(t,0)-p+t > 0 if  Cr < rx/(r-c1)x2  and (b) r(t,0)-p+t < 0 if 
> rx/(r-c1)x2. 
(ii)  if  r(t)-p+t  C  0 and r  > ((t)P+t)Jlr/(tP(t)i),  then firm 1 chooses 
vertical supply and r(t,O)-p+t < 0 at the vertical supply equilibrium. 
(iii) if r(r)-p+.  0 and Cr  (rP(t)_p+t)nr/(rP(t)ci),  then firm 1 chooses 
vertical foreclosure. 
£XQQ.t: i) From (4.10),  rP(t)-p+t ￿  0  is s sufficient condition for vertical supply. 
From (4.9)  at  s—v—0, r(t,0)-p+t > 0 if  x -  (r(t,0)-c1)x > 0. Rearrangement of  this 
last expression yields parts (a)  and (b).  (ii) Condition (4.10)  holds under these 
conditions. Also since d(r-p+t)/dr > 0 from (3.12),  and r(t,0) C rP,  we hsve r(t,0)- 17 
p+t C  0.  (iii) Under  these conditions,  from (4.10), ir(r(t),t,0)  ? 
5.  Optimal  Export  Policy by Country 1 
This section  is concerned with the implications  of  the vertical  connection 
between  export markets  for welfare maximizing  export  policies  in  country  I. 
The welfare  or  objective  function  in  country I is, 
W(r,t-s,v)  — ir5(r,ts,v) 
- sy1(r,t-s) + vx(r,r-s)  (5.1) 
where r — r(t-s,v)  r' (t-s) (with the Lagrange multiplier  p — 0  from  (4.7) and 
vertical  supply  if strictly  less  than)  or  r — r9(t-s)  (with p > 0 and vertical 
foreclosure).  Since all of  y1 and x is exported,  country 1 gains by maximizing 
the profit of firm  I less any net subsidy  (or plus any net tax payment). 
Although  W(r,t-s,v)  is continuous,  the total  derivatives,  dW/ds  and dW/dv 
are not continuous  at r — r(t-s).  This arises from  the fact that if a change in  s 
or v  maintains  r at r(t-s) (with p ?  0)  then  exports x remain  at zero: 
dx(r,t-s)/ds  — xrr + y — 0 and  dx(r,t-s)/dv  0  (5.2) 
whereas  if p — 0  and  r  is  reduced  below  r, then dx(r,t-s)/ds  — x5r,(t-s,v) ÷ y 
and dx(r,t-s)/dv — xrrv(t-s,v),  which  are not generally  zero. It is therefore 
convenient  to consider optimal  export  policies  in  situations  of vertical  supply 
separately  from  optimal policies  under vertical  forceclosure.  This  is done in 
subsections  A and B respectively.  Finally,  we  examine  globally optimal  policy  in 
subsection  C allowing  for the possibility  that the government  in country I may 
shift the equilibrium  from  vertical  supply  to  vertical  foreclosure  or vice  versa. 
A.  Policy  under  Vertical  Supply 
We first consider  the effect of an export  subsidy  to the final  good  on the 
profit  earned  by firm  1 and on welfare  in the exporting  country.  Differentiating 
(4.5) assuming  yc is chosen  optimally,  and imposing ir 
—  0,  the total  effect  of an 
increase  in  s on  wE is 18 
w(r,t-a,v)  — (r(t-a,v)-v-c1)y +  y1  + y1p'y > 0  (5.3) 
From (5.1),  and (5.3)  substituting for y1p'(from (3.3)), the total effect of  an 
increase in  s on  welfare in country 1 is 
dW/ds — [(r-c1 
-  (p-t+a-c1)]y 
- sy 
- (ay 
-  vxr)rz  — 0  (5.4) 
The  standard  role  for  an  export subsidy (originally derived by Spencer and 
Brander (1983)) can be  seen by  considering equation (5.4) when v  — 0  and  a  is 
initially  zero.  Ignoring  the  preaence  of  the  intermediate  good  market  (as 
reflected by the term (r-c1)y),  it  can be seen that a small subsidy to  the final 
good raises welfare because it reduces the output of  the rival firm  in a  market 
where firm  1 enjoya a positive profit margin. Aa Spencer and Brander (1983) 
show, the optimal export aubsidy for a Cournot (duopoly) firm makes  it credible 
for the exporting firm to produce what  would have been  the Stackelberg  leader 
level of  output  in the absence of a aubaidy. 
However,  the export market  for the intermediate product introduces  an 
opposing effect of  a on  profit  and welfare. A positive value of  a causes  a 
contraction in  demand by the rival firm  for  the intermediate product reducing 
the profita that firm  1 earns from  vertical aupply. As  revealed by (5.4), if firm 1 
earns a higher profit margin  from the export of  the intermediate than the final 
product, then welfare  is increased by  a small tax on  exports of  the final product. 
For any given r,  this *::Lves to switch sales from the final goods market  to the 
more profitable market  for intermediates. 
We now consider country l'a optimal policy  towards the exports of the 
intermediate product. From  (5.1), uaing ,r — -x and  — 0,  the first order 
condition for the choice of the export tax v  is dW/dv — (vx-sy)r 
—  0.  This 
defines the optimal value'3 of v as a function of a: 
v(a) — sy/x  (5.5) 19 
If there were  no  tax or auhsidy to final goods trade, (5.5) indicates that there 
would he no gain from government intervention in the market for intermediates. 
Also, active commercial policy  requires a  subsidy to both exports or a tax to 
both  exports. It is never optimal to subsidize exports of the final product and to 
tax exports of  the intermediate product or  vice  versa. 
A subsidy to exports of the final product creates a wedge between firm l's 
objective function and welfare in  country 1,  distorting firm  l's choice of the 
export price r. Firm 1 ignors the effect  of  an  increase in r  on the net  cost  of 
the subsidy to taxpayers. The export price r is set above the optimal level so as 
to increase y1 and the total subsidy received. Since r  > 0  (see (4,8)), this is 
corrected by setting v < 0,  that is by  also subsidizing the export of the 
intermediate product. At the optimal value of  v,  a small change in  r has no 
effect on  the total subsidy payment for both  exports (d(vx-sy1)/dr — vx-sy  — 0) 
and there is no distortion in the choice of  r. A small increase in  r incteases the 
subsidy payment by  increasing y1 but this is just offset by a lower subsidy 
payment because of the reduction in  exports x. 
If both a and v are chosen optimally then from (5.4)  and (5.5), the optimal 
value  of s satisfies the first order condition, 
dW/ds — [r(t-s,v(s)) - p  + t]y 
-  sY5  — 0  (5.6) 
That is,  at the optimum, s — (r 
-  p  + t)y/Y5. Proposition 4 sets out Country l's 
jointly optimal policy  towards the exports of  firm 1 given initial vertical supply. 
Proposition 4 (assume vertical supply at s—v—O) 
It  is optimal for country 1 to 
(i)  tax the exports of  both  products if  firm 1 earns a higher profit margin 
from  the export of  the intermediate than  the final product at  s—v—U: 
a < 0 and v — v(s)  > 0 if r(t,0) 
-  p  + t >  0  (5.7) 20 
(ii)  subsidize the exports of  both products if firm  1  earns a lower profit 
margin from the export of  the intermediate than  the final product at s—v—0: 
s > 0 and v  — v(s) < 0  if  r(t,0) -  p  + t <  0  (5.8) 
£1221:  From (5.4) et s—v—0, dW/ds < 0 if  r(t,0)-p+t > 0  and  dW/ds > 0 if  r(t,0)- 
p+t <0.*** 
Given  initial vertical supply, we know  from Propositions 1(i) and 3(i)  that 
r(t,0)-p+t > 0 if independent supplies x2 are not too responsive to price and t is 
poaitive.  From Proposition 4, it is optimal to tax both exports in this case. High 
values of c  are associated with  the subsidization of  both  exports. 
Since a is larger than v in absolute value  (from (5.5)  and  y/x  < 1),  the 
direction in  which  commercial policy aims to switch trade flows is generally 
indicated by the sign  of  a. There is  some ambiguity in  the response of  exports to 
a change in  s when  v is set optimally, but under linear demand and supply 
conditions,  an increase in  s, maintaining v  — v(s),  causes a net expansion in 
exports of the final product and s reduction in  exports of intermediates14.  If s 
is positive, then both exports are subsidized, but sales of  the final good are 
given relatively more encouragement since, with  s + v > 0,  firm l's enjoys a 
greater increase in  its profit margin from the export of  the final than the 
intermediate good. 
Since s is positive if and only  if  firm  1 initially earns a lower profit 
margin  from the export of  the intermediate than  the final good (r(t,0)-p+t < 0), 
it follows that the net effect of  government intervention is to widen  or amplify 
the initial difference in  relative returns. With linear demand and supply, optimal 
policy then  serves to expand the export of  the good with  the higher profit 
margin and to contract the export of the good  with  the lower profit margin. 21 
B.  Polic:y Under Vertical Foreclosure 
We  now  consider optimal policy for the case where p ? 0  and  r — r(t-s). 
From  (4.7), p ￿  0  implies  ,r(r,t-s,v)  ? 0  in equilibrium.  From differentiation  of 
(5.1),  using  (4.6),(5.2),(5.3) and  ,r — -x,  the first order conditions for a local 
maximum of  welfare reduce to: 
dW/ds — y1p'dy2/ds 
-  sdy1/ds  — 0  and  dW/dv  — 0  for all v  (5.9) 
where dy2/ds — yr + y  — xr  0  (—  0  if x2 
—  0),  and dy1/ds — yr + y  > 0. 
If  Y2 — x2(r) > 0,  an  increase in  a reduces the Cournot equilibrium level of  Y2 
holding r constant (y C 0),  but r  and marginal cost C(x2)  — r also falls with 
the cut back  in x2.  The net effect is a reduction in  y2 and an increase in y1 so 
that the optimal value of  s satisfies: s — y1p'(dy2/da)/(dy1/ds)  > 0.  This is the 
Spencer and Brander (1983) result that an  export subsidy increases profit in  a 
Cournot duopoly. If  x2 — 0,  vertical foreclosure gives firm 1 a monopoly of  the 
market for the final good and no policy  intervention is called for. 
C.  Globally Optimal Policy 
The previous sections have been concerned with optimal policy  towards 
exports given the vertical supply or vertical foreclosure decision of firm 1 at 
s—v—O. However, the discontinuities in  dW/ds and dW/dv at  r — r(t-s)  mean  that 
these local policies may not be  globally optimal. This section develops globally 
optimal policy  for country 1. A main question is whether  'government 
foreclosure' could be in the interests of  the exporting country. Could country 1 
gain by inducing foreclosure  in situations where firm 1 chooses vertical supply. 
In  addition to our usual aasuption that C  > 0, we  assume throughout this 
section that demand for the final good  and supply of  the intermediate good in 
country 2 is linear  (p''(Y) — 0  and xr — 0),  much  simplifying the analysis. 
In  order to link the two branches of  policy, it is useful  to define a critical 22 
value  of s — , satisfying  r(rP,t-B,v(B))  — 0,  at which vertical  foreclosure just 
occurs. Maintaining r  — r(t-s)  and v — v(s) as in (5.5),  from differentiation of 
(4.9), using x — 0 •1 —  y  —0, x  —0  and q  <0, 
dir(r,t-s,v(s))/ds  — (y(l-p'Y5) 
- x)r +  Y5(l-p'y)  > 0  (5.11) 
From (5.11), a reduction in  s below  B reduces ,r(r,t-s,v(s))  making  it negative 
and inducing vertical supply. Similarly, it can be  shown that an increase in  s 
above B, with  v  — v(B)  fixed, increases  ir(r,t-s,v(s))  and maintains vertical 
foreclosure. If  s < B and v  — v(s),  we  have a vertical supply equilibrium  and the 
effect of a change in s on  welfare is given by (5.6).  Alternatively,  if s  I, we 
have  vertical foreclosure, and holding v fixed at v — v(B),  the effect of an 
increase in s on welfare is given by (5.9)". 
Propositions 5 and 6 are concerned with  the globally optimal policy fot 
country 1, taking into account that a suitable choice of policy could result  in 
either vertical foreclosure or vertical supply in equilibrium. The proofs of  these 
propositions are in  Appendix B. 
Prorosition  5:  (Assume p''(Y) — 0  and  xr  — 0) 
(i)  The globally optimal policy for country 1 is to  tax the exports of both 
goods  (s C 0 and v  — v(s) > 0),  and to  maintain vertical supply  if, at  s=v—O,  (a) 
• 0 and  rP-p+t > 0, or (b) r(t)-p+t  ? 0 and, at the initial vertical supply 
equilibrium, 0 C r  < rx/(r-c1)x2. 
(ii)  The globally optimal policy is to subsidize the exports of  both goods (s 
> 0 and v  — v(s) C 0) and to maintain vertical supply if,  at  s—v—0, r(t)-p+t  0 
and, at  the initial vertical supply equilibrium, Cr > 
Proposition  5 shows that for a  wide class of  cases where  there is initial 
vertical  supply, either taxes or  subsidies may be  optimal, but it is not in countty 
l's interest to induce vertical foreclosure. If  there is  initial vertical supply and 23 
the elasticity of supply of  x2 is small, the profits of  firm 1 are increased by 
taxing the exporta of both  goods. At a larger elasticity of  supply of x2,  the 
globally optimal policy switches to an  export subsidy for both  goods, but as long 
as r(t)-p+t  ?  0,  the subsidy to the final good is not so large as to cause 
vertical foreclosure. 
An important element in  the proof  of  Proposition 5 is to  show that the 
profit margin from  the sale of  the intermediate good exceeds the profit margin 
from the sale of  the final good at  s — , the point at  which  foreclosure just 
occurs: r(t-6)-p+t  > 0. If  6 > 0,  this is a sufficient condition for the global 
optimality of  vertical supply. It is possible that this condition does not hold  for 
the one case of  initial vertical supply  not covered by  Proposition 5.  This is the 
case listed in Proposition 3(u) in  which Cr is sufficiently large to induce 
vertical supply at s—v—0 even  though the profit margin  on  the final good exceeds 
the profit margin on  the intermediate good at r — r(t). It  is then possible that 
r(t-6)-p+t  C 0,  and, from (5.6), we  may have dW/ds > 0 at s — 6  if  6  is  smsll.  In 
this  eventuality,  government  foreclosure  is the globally optimal policy. 
Proposition 6 shows that if firm  1 has chosen vertical foreclosure  initially, 
then  it is always in  country l's interest to  maintain  foreclosure. 
Proposition 6: (Assume p''(Y) — 0  end  xr — 0) 
If there is vertical  foreclosure at  s—v—0, it  is optimal for country 1 to 
maintain foreclosure.  (a)  If x2  — 0 and t — 0,  no  policy  intervention is called for. 
(b) If Cr>  0,  and ir(r(t),O,O)  ? 0,  then the optimal policy  is to subsidize the 
export of the final good.*** 
£.  Conclusion 
Many large manufacturing  firms have  secured their access to important 
intermediate products by  integrating backwards so as to produce the intermediate 24 
product within the corporation. If  the intermediate product can be  produced more 
cheaply in one country than another, then vertital integration can give firas in 
one country a cost advantage relative to foreign rivals. Such differences of  cost 
are a natural consequence of  differences in endowments and technology across 
countries. This leads to the question as to whether high  cost manufacturers need 
be concerned about dependence on imports of  a key intermediate input from  a 
country that is also a  major  exporter of  the final manufactured product. 
This paper addresses this issue by  first examining the conditions under 
which a low cost vertically  integrated manufacturer will  export  an intermediate 
product, lowering the costs of a rival producer of  the final product. We show 
that the tendency towards vertical supply is increased both  by a greater 
responsiveness of  supplies in the importing country and (more surprisingly) by a 
reduction in  the total (fixed) quantity of supplies available at  the foreclosure 
point. Also, an  import tariff on  the final good increases the incentive for 
vertical supply. In  Appendix A, we show  that these general tendencies continue 
to  hold if there is Bertrand rather than Cournot competition  for the final 
differentiated products. 
Secondly, we  consider the implications of optimal government policy  in the 
exporting country for the vertical supply decision. Although  the exporting firm 
tan optimize on  its own by setting the export price for the intermediate product 
prior to the determination of the second stage levels of  production  of the final 
good, there is still a role for government. With  Cournot competition in  the 
market for the final good, this role is partly a consequence  of the fact that an 
export subsidy increases domestic welfare in  a Cournot duopoly. However,  the 
vertical connection between markets opens up  the possibility  that final export 
sales should be taxed instead of subsidized. Such an outcome is a consequence  of- 25 
a higher profit margin  from the export of  the intermediate than  the final good 
(arising from a sufficiently high  tariff on imports of  the final good). Although 
the optimal commercial policy in  such a case is to tax both exports, the 
relatively higher  tax on  final goods serves to divert sales to the more profitable 
market  for intermediates increasing the extent of  vertical supply. 
Overall, our results indicate that  in a  broad class of cases a  high  cost firm 
need not be  concerned about full vertical foreclosure. Nevertheless, the price at 
which  foreign supplies of  the intermediate product can be imported may be  high. 
The analysis is based on  the assumption that a single vertically  integrated firm 
controls the exports of both  products from  country  1. If  this assumption  is 
relaxed, allowing for more than one vertically  integrated exporter from the low 
cost country, then it seems reasonable to conjecture that increased competition 
from exporters would increase the extent of  vertical supply. 
Another direction  in which the results could be generalized would be to 
consider the potential for bargaining between the low cost and high  cost firm 
concerning the price and quantity of  exports of  the intermediate product. If 
there is a tariff on the import of  the final good, the joint profit maximizing 
solution would be for firm 1  to export the intermediate product only, giving firm 
2 s monopoly of  the market  for the final good in  country  2. However, this 
solution would require non linear pricing and may be difficult to enforce. 
Merger between the two firms would seem to be a better means of 
achieving this outcome, but it may be  ruled out by antitrust policy. If  the 
possibility  is admitted that there may  be  more than one rival firm in the 
importing country, it may not be  possible to  monopolize  the industry fully 
making  the merger  solution less attractive. Even if remains profitable  to merge, 
there is then  still the issue of whether to supply the remaining rival firms. 26 
Appendix A 
It is useful to consider briefly the implications of  Bertrand rather than 
Cournot competition in  the market for the final product. The demand curvea for 
the final differentiated products y1 and y2 are assumed to  be linear and are 
represented by 
y1 — a  - b1p1 + d1p2 and y2 — a  - b2p2 + d2p1.  (A.l) 
The outputs y1 and y2  have  prices p  and p2 respectively and the constants 
a,b,,b2,d1,d2  are all positive with b1 and b2 strictly greater than d1 and d2.  For 
reasons of brevity, we consider only the policies  t end s.  From (A.l)  and (21) 
with  p replaced by  p1  the first order condition for the second stage choice of 
p1  by firm 1 given Pz and r,t and s is, 
r(p1,p2,r,t-s)  —  y1 
-  (p1-c1-t+s)b1 ÷ (r-c1)d2  — 0  (A.2) 
The presence of  the export market  for the intermediate product has a 
fundamental effect on  firm l's choice of  its export price p1 under Bertrand 
competition. As shown by  the positive third term of (A.2),  firm 1  recognizes that 
an increase in  its export price p1 will increase its profits from the export of the 
intermediate product by  raising its rival's level of production  of the final good. 
The second stage choice of  P2 by firm  2  satisfies the standard Bertrand 
first order condition: '4 —  y2 
-  (p2-r)b2  — 0.  This condition,  together with (A.2) 
defines the equilibrium prices p1 — p'(r,t-s) and Pz  — p2(r,t-a) with partial 
derivatives p—b2(d1+2d2)/o > 0, p—(2b1b2+(d1)2)/a > 0, p—-p—-2b1b2/o  C 0 and 
< 0 where m—4b1h2-d1d2  > 0. At these equilibrium prices, firm  la 
profit can be  written as it'  —  rE(r,t..s)  and, using  (A.2), we  can show 
'4(r,t-s) — $p + x -  (r-c,)'4 and '4 —  fip + y1  (A.3) 
where fi 
—  -(r-c1)b2  + (p1-c1-t+s)d1.  By  a similar argument as in (4.7),  firm 1 
chooses vertical supply if  i4(r,t-s)  C 0 where r  is defined by  x — 0.  From 27 
(A.3), the condition  fi  c 0 is sufficent (but not necessary) for vertical supply. As 
is the case  with Cournot competition, both  a tsriff on  the import of  the final 
good and a responsive supply of  the intermediate product in country  2  tend  to 
increase the likelihood of  vertical supply. Also, if  the supply curve x2(r)  is 
vertical at r, an  exogenous increase in  these supplies tends to move  the 
equilibrium towards vertical foreclosure. (At the vertical intercept of FF  in 
Figure 1 for the Bertrand case, from  (A.3), fi 
— 0  and and an  exogenous increase 
in  x2 increases the boundary level of  t  dt/dx2 — (d1p 
- b2)dr/dx2/d1(l-p)  > 
0.  The sign of  dt/dx2 follows from p  C 1, p  < 1 and d1 C  b2). 
Welfare in the exporting country can be  represented by W —  -  a.  Using 
— 0,  it  can be shown that dW/ds —  -  sdy1/ds  at a vertical supply 
equilibrium. Since p  < 0,  if  the profit margin  r -  c1  from  the export  of the 
intermediate product is small then fi > 0, and W is increased by  a small  tax to 
the export of  the final good. This is a gereralizstion of the Eaton and Grossman 
(1986) result that an  export tax increases welfare in the exporting country under 
Bertrand duopolistic competition. However, fi  may  be  negative and optimal policy 
then switches to  a subsidy to the export of  the final good. 
In choosing its export price p1, firm  1 takes the price Pa as given. Since 
Pa increases in  response to an  increase in  Pi'  considering the market  for the 
final good  alone, firm  1 is not sufficiently  'aggressive' in  raising its price. 
However an increase in  p1 increases profits from  the export of  the intermediate 
good by  less than a fixed level of  Pa would  imply. Firm  1 therefore tends to be 
'overly agressive'  in raising p1 so as to  obtain profits from the sale of  x. If P  C 
0,  firm 1 is 'overly aggressive' on  balance and  welfare in  country 1 is improved 
by reducing the equilibrium levels of  p1 and Pa by a  positive export subsidy  s. 28 
Appendix B 
Proof of  ProDosition 5: 
(i) If c  — C and r-p+t>O, or if r(t)-p+t ￿  C  and, at the initial vertical 
supply  equilibrium, C < 
c,, < rx/(r-c1)x2  then, from Propositions 1(i) and 3(1) part 
(a),  r(t,C)-p+t > C at  the vertical supply equilibrium. From Proposition 4(i), the 
locally optimal policy is to  set s C C and v  — v(s) > C.  (ii)  If r(t)-p+t  ? 0  and 
Cr > rx/(r-c1)x2,  then Proposition 3(i) part (b)  applies and r(t,C)-p+t < C at  the 
vertical supply eqilibrium. From Proposition 4(u),  the locally optimal policy  is to 
set a > C and v  — v(s) C 0.  From (4.9)  and (5.5), 8 —  At 
a — 8,  from (5.6), the (left hand  side) derivative of  W with  respect to s  is then 
dW/ds — [(rP(t-8)_p+t)(yY  - yY3)  + (r(t-8)-ct)xYs1/Yr  (El) 
Since there is vertical supply at s—v—C, 8 is strictly positive. Also, rP(t)p+t  0 
and d(r(t-s)-p+t)/ds  — -x/3x1 > C for p''  (Y) — C  implies that r(t-8)-p+t  > 0 
ensuring that (El) is negative. An increase in  a to  the vertical  foreclosure point 
reduces welfare. 
It  remains to show that welfare would be  reduced by  a policy  of increasing 
a above the vertical foreclosure point  (for both  parts  (i)  and (ii)). For a ￿  5, 
from ir(r(t-s),t-s,v)  ?  C,  r  C C,  (4.9) and yr  — xr - y, 
— -(p-t-c1)xr 
- syr -(r(t-s)-p+t)y  -vxr4  C  (82) 
From (5.9)  and (3.3),  if a ? 8, 
dW/da — -(p-t-c1)xr 
-  s(Y5r + Y)  (83) 
Therefore,  from (82)  and (53),  for s ￿  8, 
dW/ds  (r(t-s)-p+t)y 
- s(yr + ')  + 'rr  (84) 
Since, yr  +  > C, r(t-s)-p+t  > C and v(8) < C for a  8 > C,  (84)  is negative 
at v — v(8),  and an increase in s  above 8 reduces welfare.*** 29 
Proof of  Proposition 6: 
Ifx2—O andt—O, or if cr>Oandr(rP(t),O,O)￿Oats_v_O,  wehave 
initial vertical  foreclosure, implying that  0 (  — 0 if  x2 — 0)  and v() ￿ 0.  If 
x2  0,  then dy2/ds — 0  and it follows from (5.9) that dW/ds < 0 for 
a >  — 0  and it is locally optimal to set s—v—0. If Er>  0,  from  (5.9), UW/ds > 0 
at  s — 0  and  it  is locally optimal to set s > 0 and v — v(a)  < 0. 
It remains to show that vertical supply reduces welfare in both cases. Since 
ir(rP(t),O,O) ?0,  from (4.9), we have  rP(t)-p+t  0 (—0  for x2  0 and t —0) at 
s—v—0. Since  0 and (from (3.5)  and p''(Y) — 0,  d(rP(t-s)-p+t)/ds —xp'r  > 0 
this implies that rP(t-)-p+t  0. Using dr/ds — y(l-p'Yr)/1tr < 0 (see footnote 
14) and r 
—  (5y/3)-2x < 0 it can be shown that d[r(t-s,v(s))-p+t]/ds — (2- 
6P'X)/9P'1tr > 0. Hence, r(t-s,v(s))-p+t < 0 for all  s  < .  From (5.6), this implies 
that dW/ds > 0 for all s <  0 and the result follows.*** 30 
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I.  This action was facilitated by a  U.S.  anti-dumping  action  against certain 
computer chips  from  Japan.  However  the price  increase for DRAM computer  chips 
was more than  required  by  the trigger price anti-dumping  measure.  The American 
policy  encouraging  the Japanese  to  restrict the export of  computer  chips  is hard 
to defend  on the basis of the analysis  developed  in  this paper. Another  exercise 
of  U.S.  commercial  policy  that fits the main lines of our model  is the 1986 
imposition  of a 35% duty on final cedar shakes and shingles from  Canada,  in  pert 
motivated  by a desire  to coax out greater Canadian  exports of raw cedar blocks 
and logs. 
2.  The idea  that vertical  foreclosure  can increase  profits is related  to rhe 
general  idea  that s firm  in an oligopoly can gain  hy increasing  the coaca  of its 
rivals.  Salop and Scheffman  (1983) and (1987) show  that a dominant  firm  may 
gain  by raising the costs of  its rivals  through such  means  as union  contracts  or 
overbuying  of inputs that  also  serve to  raise  its own costs. Our model  differs 
since  it concerns the tradeoff between the direct profits earned  from the export 
of a unit  of the intermediate product with the loss  from the reduction  in the 
rival's costs  in  the market  for the final good. 31 
3.  In  Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1988), if  the upstream or intermediate good 
is supplied by  the vertically integrated firm, then  its price  is determined by 
Bertrand competition with one other supplier of  the homogeneous  good. Since the 
price of  the intermediate product equals the common level of  marginal costs, 
there is no  potential  for profits to be  made  from  vertical supply. Salinger (1988) 
assumea a Cournot type market  for the intermediate product as  well  as Cournot 
competition for the final product. Since one unit  of  the intermediate product ia 
required to  produce one unit  of  the final product, the vertically  integrated firm 
conjectures that the sale of an  additional unit of  the intermediate product will 
increase its rivals' output of the final good by  one unit. The sale of the 
intermediate product is then viewed as unprofitable if  the vertically  integrated 
firm can earn a  higher profit margin from  the sale of  the final good than the 
intermediate good. Our approach allows the low cost firm  to recognize the extent 
to which the importing firm will substitute imported supplies for its own 
production. 
4.  Quirmbach  (1986) shows that vertical supply  (or partial forward vertical 
integration) by an  upstream monopolist can be an  equilibrium strategy if the 
downstream industry is perfectly contestable and the monopolists's downstream 
subsidiary faces diminishing returns. Since downstream firms just  break even, the 
monopolist's profit  is the industry profit. The monopolist  then  has an incentive 
to supply some independent downstream firms so  as to lower industry costs of 
production. This motive  for vertical supply does not arise in our model since the 
exporting firm  can  produce the downstream product at  constant marginal cost. 
In moat  of  the litersture all the downstream producers are included in the 
merger, so that the issue of  vertical foreclosure  (or supply) of unintegrated fin 
does not arise. For example, see Vernon and Graham  (1971) and Mallells and 32 
Nahata  (1980) and Dixit  (1983). An  exception to this is Greenhut and Ohta 
(1979), who consider vertical integration by a subset of  oligopoliata, but vertical 
supply is not an  issue. An  excellent discussion of  the literature ia available in 
Tirole  (1988). 
5.  Allowing for other factora of production (but maintaining  the fixed 
proportions assumption) would reduce the impact of  changes in  the price of the 
intermediate good, but otherwise would not generally affect the reaults. With 
substitutability between inputa, an  increase in the price of  the intermediate good 
would cauae the rival firm  to substitute away from the higher priced  input 
making  such price increasea leaa profitable for the vertically  integrated firm. 
However, the ability of  the rival firm to produce its own suppliea of  the 
intermediate good plays a aimilar role under fixed proportions  technology so that 
introducing aubaitutability between inputs should not change  the general nature 
of the reaulta. 
6.  The choice of  s and v  by  country 1 also satisfies the requirements for a 
subgame perfect equilibrium. The entire structure could be made  aubgame perfect 
by consideration of  country 2'a optimal choice of the tariff t. We do  not do  thia 
because the reaulta do not seem sufficiently new or  interesting. 
7.  There is no  discontinuity in  x(r,t-a) at r — r  even  if  x2 — 0  ao  that 
y2(r,t-a)  — 0.  Given  (3.7)  and (3.8), the implicit function theorem implies that 
y1(r,t-a) and y2(r,t-s) defined by (3.3) and (3.4) are continuous with  continuous 
partial derivatives  for r  r.  If x2 — 0,  y2(r,t-a) (aa well  aa  x(r,t-a)) reducea 
continuously to zero aa r increases to r. 
8.  From (4.9), 
—  y(2-p'Y) 
- 2x 
-  (r-v-c1)x  + (r-p+t-(a+v))y.  If p  'Cf) 
— 0  and  xr  — 0  then  — y(2-p'Y) 
- 2x < 0. We have  x2  > 0 if  r > c2 and 
— 0  and x  — 0  if  r  c2.  In this linear case, ,r5  is also strictly concave in •r 33 
at r — c2,  since  the  left  hand derivative 4  (evaluated  for a reduction in  r 
below c2)  is less negative  than the right hand  derivative. 
9.  The signs of  r1 and r  are ambiguous in  general. See Spencer and  Jones 
(1988) for further analysis. 
10.  Along FF, r(t) changes with  t.  From  (4.10), PT  is negatively  sloped if 
dx(r,t,0)/dt — 4rrt + (l-p'Y)y + (rPp+t)y  < 0.  Since tr C  0,  r  > 0 and 1- 
> 0,  this holds  if y  is small. Under linear demand, y  — 0. 
11.  In keeping with  our assumption that c2  > c1,  the supply curve x2(r) could 
have a positive but less than infinite slope for a range of  values of  r below r". 
12.  If Cr 
— ,  the  value of  r follows from (4.9) with x —  y2  and x  — 0. Firm 1 
sets  a value of r just below c2 if  (4.9) is strictly positive at this value of  r. A 
lower value of  r determined by setting  (4.9)  equal to zero may  be optimal if, 
with s—v—0, the tariff is  sufficiently high  to make  r-p+t — c2-p÷t >  0. 
13.  It can be shown that the second order conditions,  d2W/ds2  C 0,  d2W/dv2  C 
0,  and d2W/ds2.d2W/dv2 
-  (d2W/dsdv)2 > 0 for the optimal choice of  s and  v are 
sstisfied provided that p'  '(Y)  — 0  and  rr < 0.  If demand is non linear these 
expressions depend on  third derivatives of demand. We  assume that  demand is 
sufficiently close to linear for the second order conditions to  hold. 
14.  An  increase in s,  maintaining v — v(s)  affects y1 and  x partly  through its 
effect  on r and this effect  is ambiguous. An  increase in s tends to reduce the 
demand for x but r does  not necessarily  fall.  There is a similar ambiguity in  the 
pricing response of  a monopolist  to an  increase in demand. If  p'  '(Y) — 0,  from 
(4.8), (4.9), (3.9) and (3.10), dr/ds — r5  + rv'(s) — -y(l-p'Y)/ir C 0.  If p''(Y 
0 and xr  — 0,  using ,c. as in footnote 8, we obtain dy1/ds — y[7y(l 
- P"r)  - 
8xfl/4irr  >  0 and dx/ds — y(x 
- xp'Yr)/rr C 0. 
15.  Setting v —  v(8)  is reasonable since v has  no  affect on welfare  for s ? . 34 
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